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Abstract: 
 
Both health and income inequalities have been shown to be much greater in Britain than in 
Germany. One of the main reasons seems to be the difference in the relative position of the 
retired, who, in Britain, are much more concentrated in the lower income groups. Inequality 
analysis reveals that while the distribution of health shocks is more concentrated among those 
on low incomes in Britain, early retirement is more concentrated among those on high incomes. 
In contrast, in Germany, both health shocks and early retirement are more concentrated among 
those with low incomes. We use comparable longitudinal data sets from Britain and Germany to 
estimate hazard models of the effect of health on early retirement. The hazard models show that 
health is a key determinant of the retirement hazard for both men and women in Britain and 
Germany. The size of the health effect appears large compared to the other variables. Designing 
financial incentives to encourage people to work for longer may not be sufficient as a policy 
tool if people are leaving the labour market involuntarily due to health problems.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Much of the Western world has concerns about the ageing of the population and the level of finance needed 
to support the elderly. Britain and Germany are no exception, and the problem in these countries is 
exacerbated by increasing early exit of older workers from the labour market. The policy debate has focused 
on direct changes to retirement ages and incentives designed to encourage greater pension saving.  This 
debate has neglected the important role of the health as a primary determinant of whether or not older 
workers remain in the labour market.  
 
Potential explanations for the trend towards a decreasing retirement age include more generous social 
security systems and increases in wealth compared with some decades ago. In addition more generous health 
and disability insurance systems reduce the adverse financial consequences for individuals in poor health 
who drop out of the labour market. The ‘disability route’ into retirement has been identified as an important 
phenomenon of the labour market in both countries (Riphahn, 1997; Blundell, Meghir and Smith, 2002).  
 
Despite shared pressures there are differences between the two countries. Labour force participation of 
workers aged 55-64 is around 58% in Britain and only 43% in Germany. Of the economically inactive in this 
age group 13% describe themselves as retired in the UK and 14% as ill or disabled, whereas in Germany 
these figures are 29% and 4% respectively (Frerichs and Taylor, 2005). It is likely that these differences are a 
result of, inter alia, differences in the countries’ pensions and benefits arrangements, rather than differences in 
health per se.    
 
The primary motivation of this paper is to understand the effect of health on the decision of older workers 
to leave the labour market. While some evidence exists for Britain and Germany, there is no systematic 
comparative work to assess whether the impact of ill-health on early retirement varies between the countries 
and in particular whether it varies according to levels of social protection offered by the pension and transfer 
schemes.  
 
We use comparable longitudinal data sets to estimate hazard models of the effect of health on early 
retirement. We condition on a broad set of socio-economic characteristics such as education, pension 
entitlement, housing tenure, and income; we also take account of spouse health and employment status. We 
make efforts to deal with the potential endogeneity of health, as well as the reporting bias that may result 
from our use of self-reported health measures. We also take care to ensure that our variables, and thus our 
results, are comparable across the two countries.  
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Another important issue is the fact that both health and income inequalities have been shown to be much 
greater in Britain than in Germany1. One of the main reasons seems to be the difference in the relative 
position of the retired, who, in Britain, are much more concentrated in the lower income groups.  Hence, we 
also examine concentration curves for income related health inequalities and early retirement. 
 
This analysis reveals that while the distribution of health shocks is more concentrated among those on low 
incomes in Britain, early retirement is more concentrated among those on high incomes. In contrast, in 
Germany, both health shocks and early retirement are more concentrated among those with low incomes. It 
seems that the income gradient in early retirement in Britain is offsetting the inequality in health shocks.  The 
results from our models show that health is a key determinant of the retirement hazard for both men and 
women in Britain and Germany. The size of the health effect appears large compared to the other variables, 
and in particular in relation to the pension entitlement effects in both countries.  
  
Designing financial incentives to encourage people to work for longer may not be sufficient as a policy tool 
if people are leaving the labour market involuntarily due to health problems. Indeed in this context even 
raising the statutory retirement age may have a lower effect than anticipated. Instead there is a need to 
improve the health of the work force and put resources into facilitating continued work for people with 
health problems and disabilities. 
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the background to our work, Section 3 explains our 
methods and Section 4 describes our data and variables. The results are presented in Section 5 and discussed 
in Sections 6. Section 7 concludes and considers the policy implications of our work.  
 
2. Background 
Individuals have preferences over current and future leisure which depend in part on current and expected 
health status (see for example Lazear, 1986, Disney et al., 2006). Poorer health may increase the disutility of 
work, reduce the return from work and entitle the individual to benefits that are contingent on not working. 
All of these factors will reduce the probability of continued work. However, poorer health may increase 
consumption requirements and therefore necessitate higher income; but if poorer health also reduces life 
expectancy then the annualised consumption available from existing wealth is raised, and this may still lead 
to earlier retirement.  
 
Health effects operate within the pensions and benefits system, and there is an enormous literature on the 
importance of these financial incentives in determining retirement behaviour2. However, Lindeboom (2006) 
                                                
1
 See various papers from the Ecuity projects at http://www2.eur.nl/bmg/ecuity/ 
2 See Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 1999 for a review and French (2005) for an important recent contribution. Also see 
Borsch-Supan and Schabel (1997) for Germany and Blundell et al (2002) for the UK. 
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in a comprehensive review, argues that a number of studies have shown that health is the most important 
determinant of an older persons’ labour supply. A survey for the UK Department for Work and Pensions 
(Humphrey et al 2003) found that 50% of people aged between 50 and 69 were not seeking work due to ill-
health, and 20% had been forced to retire because of ill-health. For Germany, Siddiqui (1997a, 1997b) finds 
strong effects of health on retirement behaviour. Individuals reporting a chronic condition or a disability are 
four times more likely to leave employment than healthy individuals.  
 
Our focus is on health but it is important to stress some of the key differences between Britain and Germany 
in relation to pensions and benefits. In both countries disability benefits are available before statutory 
retirement age.  In Germany, the rate depends on the extent of disability and an earnings test. Eligibility 
tends to have been interpreted generously and has been used as a device to keep unemployment rates down. 
In Britain, Incapacity Benefit (IB) is available to those unable to work because of ill-health or disability; it is 
paid at one of three rates, depending on the length of time the individual has been unable to work. IB 
replaced Invalidity Benefit in 1995, accompanied by stricter eligibility criteria, in response to a rapid growth 
in the number of recipients. These changes reduced economic incentives to retire via the ‘disability route’ 
and in principle strengthened the link between true work-related disability and inactivity. However, Berthoud 
(2004) and Peasgood et al (2006) find that after controlling for health, the probability of leaving IB declines 
with age and the majority of economically inactive people aged 50 to 65 are in receipt of IB. 
 
In general, except in the case of very low earners, Germany has a more generous pension system than 
Britain. At almost all earnings levels the net replacement rate (NRR) is much higher in Germany3. For 
example, at average earnings, the NRR is 72% in Germany and only 48% in Britain (OECD, 2005)4. While 
private pensions in Britain compensate to some extent, these are only held by 25% of men in our sample and 
12% of women. This two tier pension system contributes to inequality, compared to the more homogenous 
pension benefits available in Germany. In Britain around 33% of pensioners claim means tested benefits 
whereas in Germany it is less than 5% (Oswald, 1999; p10). However, inequality and poverty among older 
people in Germany are expected to increase as a result of pressures on the pension system (Nagaele and 
Walker, 2002). Work from the ECuity projects has shown that older people are among the poorest and least 
healthy in most European countries, so as populations age the potential for increased inequality is clear.  
 
There is also a weight of evidence supporting the importance of the joint determination of the retirement 
decision of husbands and wives5 (see for example Michaud, 2003; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000; Jimenez-
Martin et al  1999; Blau and Riphahn, 1999). The effect of the health status of both partners on each others 
                                                
3The NRR is a measure of individual pension earnings divided by pre-retirement earnings, taking into account personal 
income taxes and social security contributions.  
4 The average OECD NRR at average earnings is 69% (OECD, 2005).  
5 The use of the terms husband and wife does not imply anything about the legal status of the relationship and is also 
applied here to people living as couples who are not legally married.  
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retirement decision has been largely neglected. This is an important omission because, for example, early 
retirement can be caused by the necessity to provide care for a dependent spouse.  
 
 
3. Methods 
 
Estimating the effect of health on early retirement is not straightforward, especially using the subjective 
measures of health that are generally available in longitudinal data sets. First, there may be simultaneity 
between self-assessed health (SAH) and labour market status. Secondly, SAH is based on subjective 
judgements which may not be comparable across individuals (Lindeboom and van Doorslaer 2004). Thirdly, 
since ill-health may represent a legitimate reason to be economically inactive, respondents who are not 
working may cite health problems as a way to rationalize behaviour (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom 1995; 
Kreider, 1999).  Fourthly, individuals for whom the financial rewards of continuing in the labour force are 
low, have an incentive to report ill-health as means of obtaining disability benefits. While measurement error 
will lead to downward bias in the estimate of the effects of health on labour market status, the other effects 
will lead to upward bias (Bound 1991). The common assumption in the literature seems to be that the latter 
outweighs the former but Bound et al. (1995) point out that the empirical evidence is mixed.  
 
We employ a method first used by Stern (1989) and Bound (1991), which was implemented in Bound et al., 
(1999) and subsequently adopted by Au et al., (2005) and Disney et al., (2006). In common with many studies 
of health and socio-economic status, the SAH measure used in our models provides an ordinal ranking of 
perceived health status. For example, the data for Britain is derived from the question: “ …would you say 
that your health has on the whole been excellent/good/fair/poor/very poor?”.  The method involves 
estimating a model of this ordinal SAH variable as a function of a set of health indicators (see Data section) 
to define a latent ‘health stock’ variable. This predicted health variable is then used as an indicator of health 
in the model of retirement.  Adopting this instrumental variable-type procedure where a proxy with error is 
used to instrument an endogenous and error-ridden variable is a standard way of dealing empirically with 
errors-in-variables (see also, Griliches, 1974 and Fuller, 1987). To investigate the robustness of our results we 
use alternative measures of health; for Germany we use SAH directly, and for Britain we use a measure of 
health limitations, which is arguably less prone to reporting bias than SAH.   
We use the duration model approach of Jenkins (1995) to estimate the effect of health on the probability of 
early retirement. The transition to retirement is represented as a discrete time hazard model. This method 
relies on a reorganisation of the data so that the unit of analysis is changed from the individual to the time at 
risk of an event (in this case retirement), thus allowing a complex sequence likelihood to be simplified to 
standard estimation for a binary outcome. The approach also controls for the stock sampling of only those 
people who are in the labour market at the first time we observe them. These individuals can then either stay 
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in the labour force or exit into retirement. The assumption here is of a single exit (retirement) from the initial 
state, modelled as a binary response (probit).   
 
We specify a complementary log-log hazard rate, the discrete-time counterpart of the hazard for an 
underlying continuous-time proportional hazards model (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978). The baseline hazard 
is modelled as a step function, using dummy variables to represent the age our stock sample of individuals is 
at risk.  This non-parametric form leads to a semi-parametric specification of the discrete-time duration 
model. The model can be generalised to account for unobserved heterogeneity uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables (Narendrenathan and Stewart, 1993).  All estimation is carried out in STATA using the 
pgmhaz routine (Jenkins, 1997).  
 
Of further relevance is whether a change in labour market status is best identified by a health shock or by, 
for example, a slow deterioration in health6.  Modelling health shocks is a convenient way to eliminate one 
source of potential endogeneity bias caused through correlation between individual-specific unobserved 
factors and health because differencing the data over consecutive time periods eliminates unobserved 
individual effects.   
 
We include a measure of lagged health together with initial period health in our models.  By conditioning on 
initial period health the coefficient on lagged health represents the effect of a health shock.  It also seems 
plausible that lagged health may be more informative about the decision to retire because transitions take 
time.  This also reduces fears of endogeneity bias, exploiting the timing of events by observing the effect of 
health shocks prior to the time of retirement (for example, see Abring and van den Berg, 2003).  
 
Attrition is generally a problem with longitudinal data and this may be health-related7, or be related to labour 
market status (for example, see Zabel (1998) and Ziliak and Kniesner (1998)).  A systematic relationship 
between health and labour market participation and attrition will lead to bias in our empirical models. To test 
for such bias we use a simple variable addition test as proposed by Verbeek and Nijman (1992, p. 688).  The 
test variable we use is an indicator for whether the individual responds in the subsequent wave.  This is 
regressed, together with the set of conditioning variables, on the retirement indicator using the discrete-time 
duration framework. A test of the significance on the corresponding parameter estimate provides a test for 
attrition bias8.   
 
                                                
6
 We use the term health shock, as it has been traditionally used in the literature, to mean deterioration in health over a 
set time period (usually one or two years in our analysis).  
7 See Contoyannis, Jones, and Rice (2004) and Jones, Koolman, and Rice, N. (2006) for a discussion of health-related 
attrition and the consequences for models of the determinants of health using the BHPS. 
8 It should be noted that the test has low power and is not intended to correct for any observed attrition bias (Verbeek, 
2000).  
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As well as duration models for retirement, we also examine concentration curves (CCs) for income related 
health inequalities and early retirement. This takes the sample of older workers who are ‘at risk’ of early 
retirement and looks at the incidence of subsequent health shocks that may be associated with subsequent 
early retirement. The CCs provide measures of relative income-related health inequality (Wagstaff, Van 
Doorslaer and Paci, 1989). These measures capture the socioeconomic dimension of health inequalities, use 
information from the whole of the distribution rather than just the extremes and give the possibility of visual 
representation. 
 
4. Data and Variables  
Three main data sources are used in this study. The first two are nationally representative longitudinal surveys 
for Britain and Germany that include a rich set of socio-economic variables. In the German Socio-economic 
Panel (GSOEP) the same private households have been surveyed annually since 1984, when 5,921 
households containing 12,290 respondents participated in the ‘SOEP West’ survey. This was expanded in 
1990 to include the former German Democratic Republic, and this ‘SOEP East’ sample included 2,179 
households with 4,453 respondents.  The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) started later in 1991.  The 
first wave achieved a sample of around 5,500 households, covering approximately 10,300 adults. Additional 
samples of 1,500 households for Scotland and Wales were added in 1999, and 2,000 in Northern Ireland in 
2001. 
 
While the BHPS and GSOEP are generally thought to be equivalent types of data they do not have cross-
national comparability as a survey goal. We supplement the individual country surveys with information 
from the Cross National Equivalent File (CNEF). This is the result of collaboration between researchers 
working with longitudinal data from individual countries9; the aim of which is to produce compatible data 
sets for use in cross-national research. The CNEF unites comparably defined variables from the BHPS and 
the GSOEP that can be used independently or in tandem with the original survey data. In addition, it 
provides a set of constructed variables that are not immediately available in the original data (for example 
‘pre- and post-government’ household income10).  Distributions of key variables were produced to check for 
data quality and compatibility between the three data sets.  
 
We consider the same time period for Britain and Germany, from 1991 to 2002. The econometric analysis 
uses a stock sample, which consists of those individuals who were aged 50 or over and had a full interview 
and were in the labour force (employed or self-employed) in wave 1 of the survey. For Britain we start with 
641 men and 494 women, and for Germany 790 and 396. The samples are reduced over time by attrition, 
which largely arises through refusal, non-contact and because people become ineligible to participate. For 
                                                
9 The US, Germany, Britain, Canada and Australia provide longitudinal data for the CNEF.  
10 Pre- (post-) government income is household income before (after) taxes and transfers.  
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both the BHPS and the GSOEP we start with just over 1100 people and this is reduced by over one third by 
the end of the period. At this time almost half of the original sample is retired.  
 
All variable codes and definitions are summarised in the Appendix.  The dependent variable is retirement 
status and in line with previous work, the definition of retirement is self-reported11. We model the first 
transition out of labour market activity12; it is a dichotomous variable that takes a value 1 if the individual is 
retired and 0 otherwise.  
 
The key explanatory variable is health status and this is constructed using the general SAH question from the 
BHPS and the GSOEP13. For the BHPS the standard question is ‘over the last 12 months, compared to 
people of your own age, would you say your health on the whole has been: excellent, good, fair, poor, very 
poor’. For the GSOEP the question is ‘how would describe your current state of health: very good, good, 
satisfactory, poor, bad.’ Unfortunately, as is often the case in longitudinal studies, there are some 
inconsistencies in these questions over time in both countries14. This leads us to construct a 4-point SAH 
classification for each wave, as shown below:  
 
 
SAH_4 BHPS  GSOEP 
1   Poor health very poor & poor bad & poor 
2   Fair health fair satisfactory 
3   Good health good Good 
4   Excellent health excellent very good 
 
 
This SAH variable is used to create a latent health stock variable as described in the Methods section, for use 
in our duration models of early retirement. For the UK we estimate health stock by regressing SAH (via an 
ordered probit model) on a set of ‘specific health problems’.  Here the respondent is asked whether or not 
they have any of the problems listed: arms, legs or hands, sight, hearing, skin conditions or allergies, 
chest/breathing, heart/blood pressure, stomach or digestion, diabetes, anxiety or depression, alcohol or 
                                                
11
 As has already been noted in the literature (e.g. Bardasi et al 2002; Disney et al 1994) retirement is not a well-defined 
state. We have cross checked self-reported retirement status data with income source data (for Britain) and time use 
data (for Germany) in order to assess its reliability. While certainly not perfect as an indicator of retired status, the self-
reported measure is suitable for our analysis.  
12 Of those people aged over 50 and retired in any one wave, a small proportion are participating in the labour market 
again in subsequent waves. Subsequent transitions could be analysed but, due to the small sample sizes, we have chosen 
not to pursue this. 
13 We rejected the CNEF health variable on the grounds of poor comparability across the two countries.  
14 In the BHPS there is a change in wording for wave 9 only to ‘In general would you say your health is: excellent, very good, good, 
fair, poor.’ To achieve consistency over all waves we base our 4-point reclassification on the analysis in Hernandez-
Quevedo, Jones and Rice (2005). In the GSOEP the question was not asked in 1991 or 1993; in these years the 11 point 
‘satisfaction with health’ question was available, so the distributions for these variables were matched to our constructed 
4 point scale in 1992 and 1994 in order to create data for the missing years. In addition the 5 point scale health question 
was not asked in 1991 for East Germany so the 1990 values are used in its place.  
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drugs, epilepsy, migraine or other. For Germany, fewer health indicators are available thus the constructed 
health stock measure is obtained by regressing SAH on all available socioeconomic variables (except labour 
market status), formal disability rating and satisfaction with health15. The estimated latent health stock is then 
used as an indicator of health in the model of retirement16.  
In addition to the models using latent health stock for both countries, alternative health measures have been 
examined. For the UK, we use self-reported functional limitations, based on the question “does your health 
in any way limit your daily activities compared to most people of your age?”17, which is arguably less prone 
to reporting bias than the general SAH question. For Germany, an alternative health measure is not available 
so the original ordinal SAH scale is used directly in estimating the retirement hazard rates.   
 
As well as individual’s own health, the models for the UK include spousal health defined as either the latent 
health stock index or functional limitations. The models for Germany include either spousal SAH or the 
latent health stock index. Both models also include a dummy for whether or not the spouse is employed.  
 
Education is classified as a series of binary dummies. In Germany, the distinction is made between 
individuals who have received only mandatory schooling (the reference group) and those with higher levels 
of education. For Britain, the reference group are people with no formal qualifications, and dummy variables 
are defined for O-levels and CSEs, HND and A-level and higher education and beyond. 
 
For the BHPS we distinguish three categories of pension: state pension only (base), private and employer 
pension. It is expected that the latter category results in the most generous retirement income and reliance 
on a state pension is likely to result in the lowest post-retirement income. In the models for Britain we also 
include dummy variables for employment sector and occupational classification which act partly as proxies 
for pension benefits: industrial sectors are private companies, civil service and local government, and other 
the baseline is self-employment.  Occupational categories are management and administration, professional, 
clerical and secretarial, craft or related, personal services, sales, plant operative and other occupations. For 
the GSOEP there is less heterogeneity in pension coverage and the important distinction is between Class 1 
civil servants and everyone else, since the civil service pension has more generous benefits. The German 
models also include dummies for industrial sector (agriculture, energy, manufacturing, construction, trade, 
transport, banking and services, and the baseline, mining). 
 
The housing tenure variable is used to proxy for wealth and social class. For the BHPS we define four binary 
dummies: own house outright (base), own with a mortgage, live in private rented accommodation, live in 
                                                
15 Formal disability rating is an official registration made by the German Pension Office which classifies the degree of 
disability on a continuous scale. Health satisfaction is an 11 point scale ranging from “not at all satisfied” to “completely 
satisfied” with own health. 
16 In the interests of concise exposition the results of the ordered probit models used to estimate latent health stock are 
not reported here.  
17 This question is not asked in wave 9. In our analysis we assume wave 8 values hold in wave 9.  
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housing association or local authority rented accommodation.  For the GSOEP we have two binary 
dummies: owner occupier and those who live in subsidised housing.  
 
For Britain, the income variable is the individual specific mean of log equivalised household income across 
all waves prior to retirement. We use only pre-retirement waves in order to minimise endogeneity problems 
(as income will normally change significantly at retirement). For Germany the equivalent variable is the mean 
of the log of household post-government income. 
 
We distinguish those people who are married or living as a couple from those who are single, widowed or 
divorced. Dummies are included for each age prior to statutory retirement age (65 for men and 60 for 
women). Regional dummies are used to control for local labour market conditions. There are 18 regions 
defined for the UK and dummies for the North and South of Germany; the estimated coefficients are not 
reported. In Germany there are also variables that denote a person originally being from East Germany and 
that the individual does not have German citizenship.  
 
5. Results 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 show key measures for the two countries disaggregated by gender and by 
pre- and post-retirement.  Overall for both countries just over one-third of the sample retires during the time 
period under observation. The health profiles are similar, although a larger proportion of the German sample 
report health in the ‘excellent’ category, with slightly less in ‘very good or good’. For both countries, the 
post-retirement sample exhibits worse health. In Britain substantially more men than women have a private 
or employer pension. Around 25% of men and 50% of women have only a state pension. In Germany 
around 10% of men and 2% of women have the more generous Class 1 civil servants pension entitlement.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 display Kaplan-Meier estimates of the probability of survival (not retiring) by SAH status 
separately for (a) men and (b) women in both countries. For men in the UK there seems to be a clear 
relationship with the probability of retiring (at all ages)  increasing with worsening SAH. For UK women the 
relationship is not clear. In Germany, while both men and women with the lowest SAH status have the 
greatest probability of retirement at all ages there is no clear gradient for the other health levels. Kaplan-
Meier curves for the alternative health measure (the dichotomous health limitations variable)) which are not 
reported here, show a very a clear relationship for both sexes for both countries, in that people who report 
health limitations have a greater propensity to retire at all ages than those who do not report health 
limitations. Thus this simple bivariate analysis suggests that health (especially classified as health limitations) 
is important the timing of retirement. 
 
Before the econometric modelling it is useful to consider the extent of income related health and early 
retirement inequality in Britain and Germany. We use balanced samples for the concentration curve (CC) 
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analysis, based on our stock samples in wave 1. Individuals are ranked by socioeconomic status using 
equivalised household income in wave 1 (Ri)18. The analysis then proceeds in two stages. The first stage 
considers whether there is inequality in health shocks by initial socio-economic status. The relative income 
rank is plotted against the cumulative proportion of health shocks; health is measured using the original 5-
point SAH scales present in the country specific data (see Data section) and a health shock (Hi) is defined as 
a 2-point deterioration on this scale19. The 45-degree line shows the line of perfect equality, where 
population shares of health shocks are proportional to income. There is said to be pro-poor inequality if the 
CC lies above the 45 degree line and pro-rich inequality when the curve lies below the line. The size of 
inequality can be summarised by the concentration index (CI), which is twice the area between the CC and 
the 45-degree line. 
 
In the second stage, we consider whether there is inequality in health-related early retirement by initial 
socioeconomic status. Individuals are again ranked by equivalised household income in wave 1. We then 
combine the health shock indicators with an indicator of early retirement (RETi ) i.e. whether or not the 
individual retired before the prescribed state pension age. Combining the health shock (Hi) and early 
retirement (RETi) variables we define the variable HRETi  which equals 1 if a person suffers a health shock 
and retires early. Otherwise, this variable takes the value of 0. While this analysis does not imply causality, 
combined with our econometric analysis, it can help us to understand the relative position of older workers 
in relation to health related retirement.  
 
In the balanced sample for Britain there are a total of 569 individuals (307 men and 262 women); of these, 
11% of men and 7% of women experience a 2-point deterioration in SAH at some point between wave 1 
and wave 12. 39% of men and 19% of women retire early; and 6% of men and 2% of women both retire 
early and suffer a health deterioration20. The balanced sample from Germany contains 567 men and 336 
women. 9% of men and 7% of women suffer a 2-point deterioration in SAH. Early retirement is observed 
much more frequently in Germany than in Britain. More than two thirds of individuals in Germany retire 
before the prescribed state retirement age. 6% of men and 6% of women both retire early and experience a 
health deterioration.  
 
The CCs for income related health shocks (Hi) are shown in Figure 3. For both countries pro-poor inequality 
is indicated by the fact the CC is predominantly above the diagonal, suggesting that the poorest experience a 
disproportionate share of the health deteriorations. The degree of inequality is greater for Germany than for 
                                                
18 Household income consists of labour and non-labour equivalised real income, adjusted using the Retail Price Index 
and equivalised by the McClement’s scale to adjust for household size and composition. 
19 As a robustness check, we also defined a health shock in terms of the acquisition of a health limitation for the UK. 
These results are not reported but are very similar to those for 2-point SAH changes. 
 
20
 Defining a health shock as a 1-point deterioration on the 5-point scale, instead of 2-points, results in larger sample 
sizes but does not substantively change the results of the inequality analysis.  
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Britain (CI 0.105 vs. -0.042). For both countries the CC does drop below the diagonal especially near the 
left-hand side. This suggests that at the very lowest end of the income rankings this group tend to experience 
a less than proportionate number of health shocks. This may be the result of our sample selection in which 
all respondents are working in wave 1.  
 
The CCs for early retirement (RETi) are quite different between the two countries as shown in Figure 4. In 
the UK the CC is predominantly below the diagonal indicating that early retirements are concentrated among 
the richest members of our sample. The CI reflects this with a value of 0.115. The opposite is found in 
Germany with the CC being wholly above the diagonal and with a CI of -0.059. The absolute level of 
inequality in early retirement is greater in the UK than Germany.  
  
Combining early retirement and health shocks (HRETi), Figure 5 shows that for Britain we observe pro-rich 
inequality (CI = 0.088); while for Germany the opposite is true (CI = -0.102).  For both the UK and 
Germany health deteriorations are concentrated among the poorest sample members. The pro-rich inequality 
in early retirement and early retirement with a health shock in the United Kingdom indicates that moving 
into retirement before the state retirement age more commonly occurs amongst those with greater levels of 
household income. The reverse is true in Germany where there is pro-poor early retirement and early 
retirement with a health shock.  
 
Results for the hazard models of retirement for Britain are reported in Tables 2a and 2b. These models are 
estimated allowing for unobserved heterogeneity21. The first set of columns presents results for health 
limitations and the second, for our predicted latent general health stock measure.  Models for men and 
women largely show the expected gradient over age categories, with the hazard of retirement increases 
rapidly as statutory retirement age approaches. Of the income and wealth variables only log household 
income (prior to the retirement year) appears to have a significant effect. The hazard of early retirement 
increases with household income, for men this is true regardless of which health measure we use, whereas 
for women the income variable is only significant for health limitations and not for the continuous latent 
health measure. The education and occupation variables are largely insignificant for men and women, 
although for men having higher education seems to decrease the probability of early retirement if we 
measure health using the health limitation dummy.  
 
For men, the employment sector variables are positive and contrast against a baseline of self-employment.  
Accordingly, the hazard of early retirement is greater for employees compared to the self-employed.  The 
largest effect is observed for civil and local government, followed by the private sector and those employed 
                                                
21 The model incorporates a gamma mixture distribution to summarize unobserved individual heterogeneity, as 
proposed by Meyer (1990). For women the null hypothesis of no heterogeneity is not rejected but the results are very 
similar whether or not we allow for these effects.  
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in other sectors.  The effects are reversed for women where the hazard is greater for the self-employed, 
however the effects are only statistically significant for the health limitations measure.  
 
We also observe an effect of pension entitlements.  These variables represent whether an individual has 
made a contribution into a private pension plan during the observation period and/or been a member of an 
employer’s pension scheme.  Compared to the baseline of a state-only pension, having a private pension is 
associated with around a 60% decrease in the hazard of retiring for men (75% for women). In contrast, 
having an employer pension increases the hazard of retiring for men and women, but this is not significant. 
For men if the spouse has a job the hazard of retirement is decreased by around 50% but this variable is not 
statistically significant for women. Marital status is not significant for either sex.  
 
Our primary focus is the role of health.  The health variables are lagged one period to avoid problems of 
simultaneity. We also condition on the first period health status so that the estimated effect of lagged health 
can be interpreted as a health shock. Further we consider the health of a respondent’s spouse or partner.  
For men we observe a large, positive and highly significant effect for health limitations.  This implies that the 
hazard of retiring is greater for individuals experiencing a shock to health that leads to a health limitation.   
For our constructed measure of underlying latent health (which is increasing in health) we observe a negative 
and significant coefficient implying that the retirement hazard increases as health decreases. For both 
models, while we observe the expected signs, the estimated coefficients on spousal health are not significant. 
Results for the health variables for women are similar to men and quantitatively the hazard ratios are of 
similar size.  Again, the effect of spousal health is not significant.   
 
The health effects are quantitatively important when compared to the pension effects. For example, having a 
health limitation increases a man’s chances of retiring early by 460%. In comparison, a private pension 
decreases his chances by 60% and working in the civil service or local government increases his chances by 
850%. Clearly, the civil service/local government dummy is partly reflecting the effect of pension 
entitlement and early retirement options in this sector, which are not encapsulated by our relatively blunt 
pension entitlement dummy variables.  
 
The hazard model results for Germany are shown in Tables 3a and 3b22. The first set of columns presents 
the results for models where SAH was used directly. The second set of columns presents the estimates 
obtained using the predicted latent health stock.  Models for men and women show the expected gradient 
over age categories. No significant effect of higher educational attainment is found. For men, the industry 
sector of employment has some significant impacts on the early retirement hazard. Compared to the 
reference sector, mining, the hazard of retiring early is significantly lower for men working in the trade or 
                                                
22
 Models for women are estimated allowing for unobserved heterogeneity but those for men are not since the null 
hypothesis of no heterogeneity was not rejected and the results were unstable when heterogeneity was allowed for.  
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services sector. No significant effect of industrial sector is found for women. Working in the civil service 
does not have a significant on the retirement hazard despite the generous pension entitlements and early 
retirement incentives available in this sector.  
 
Being of foreign origin has a negative effect on the retirement hazard which is statistically significant for 
men.  Household income has a significant negative impact on the hazard of retirement for men, but it is not 
significant for women. None of the other wealth proxies are significant.  
 
The estimates for SAH are negative and statistically significant for all cases except excellent health for 
women. For the constructed measure of underlying latent health we observe a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient for men and women.  No statistically significant effects are observed for spouse health 
or spouse employment status. Having a spouse increases the retirement hazard for men and lowers it for 
women but the effects are statistically significant only in the latter group.  
 
Table 4 reports the results of the Verbeek and Nijman (1992) tests for attrition bias. For the BHPS models 
the ‘next wave’ variable is not statistically significant and we find no evidence of attrition bias. The same is 
true for the GSOEP models for women. For the GSOEP models for men there is evidence that sample 
attrition is related to retirement behaviour. However, inclusion of the ‘next wave’ variable results in little 
change to the coefficients on the conditioning set of variables, indicating that although attrition is related to 
retirement, its effect is likely to be negligible.  
 
6. Discussion  
The most striking result from the above models is that, regardless of the way we measure own health, it is 
found to be a key determinant of the retirement hazard for both men and women in Britain and Germany. 
The size of the health effect is large compared to the other variables, and in particular compared to the 
effects of pension entitlement in both countries. Indeed for the German models, despite the renowned 
generosity of the civil service pension, this variable is not statistically significant.  
 
In most cases the baseline health measure is not significant but the lag is, suggesting that it is health shocks 
that are important rather than continual poor health. A 1 unit decrease in latent health is estimated to 
increase men’s hazard of retirement by around 50% in Britain and around 20% in Germany, for women 
these figures are 55% and 45% respectively. The larger estimated effect of health in Britain may reflect 
increased incentives to utilise the disability route into retirement and this in turn may be due to an increased 
reliance on private sector pensions where people cannot access sufficient pension benefits before statutory 
retirement age and thus rely on other sources of income including disability insurance. However, it may also 
reflect the fact that it is easier for older workers with health problems to continue working in Germany. In 
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2002, Germany spent 0.3% of GDP on labour market programmes for people with disabilities compared to 
only 0.02% in the UK (Frerichs and Taylor, 2005).  
 
While the alternative health measures cannot be compared directly, they do confirm the relatively large 
effects of health and the fact that the effects are larger in Britain. In Britain acquiring a health limitation 
increases the hazard of retirement by a factor of 4.6 for men and 4.1 for women. In Germany, for men if 
health changes from fair to poor the hazard of retirement increases by around 35%, deterioration from good 
to poor would increase the probability by around 45%, and from excellent to poor by around 50%.   
 
The variables used to represent pension systems appear to have a greater effect on the hazard to retirement 
in Britain than in Germany. Our models do not contain detailed information on pensions and this is 
common in the literature that focuses on health effects, since detailed health and pension information is 
rarely available in the same data sets. A recent Department of Work and Pensions survey found that people 
had a very low level of knowledge about their pensions, which may cast doubt on the need for detailed 
pension information for our modelling objectives (Humphrey et al., 2003). Our main finding is that for both 
men and women in Britain the probability of retirement is reduced for people with a private pension. This 
result may be explained by the fact this group of older workers may have acquired private pensions at a 
relatively late stage in their working life in order to top up the state pension which they realised would be 
inadequate. Consequently as the benefits of private pensions are heavily dependent on the length of 
contribution period they encourage longer working lives for this group (Meghir and Whitehouse, 1997). It is 
also the case that to a certain extent our employment sector variables will reflect pension benefits and early 
retirement arrangements. So that the large positive effect of the civil service/local government variable for 
men in Britain is explained by arrangements in that sector that are conducive to early retirement; these may 
reflect pension entitlements and specific early retirement schemes such as those available to teachers. It is 
more difficult to explain the statistical insignificance of the civil service pension variable in Germany, 
however this is a small group (roughly 4% of the sample) and also the effects of the generous pension might 
be offset by better working conditions, and thus less disutility from work.  
 
These results should be interpreted in the light of the inequality analysis presented above, which showed that 
while the distribution of health shocks is pro-poor in the UK (i.e. health shocks are more concentrated 
amongst those at the lower end of the income distributions) early retirement is pro-rich, in contrast to 
Germany where both health shocks and early retirement are concentrated among those on low incomes.  For 
Britain, the income gradient in early retirement is offsetting the inequality in health shocks so that even 
though poorer individuals are more likely to have health shocks the combination of health shocks and 
retirement is ‘pro-rich’.  The income gradient may arise from the fact that the UK pension system is more 
reliant on private pension provision that Germany, and these benefits are heavily dependent on length of 
service and thus may deter people from retiring early. Only those who are financially well-off can afford to 
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retire early. This is also supported by the significant positive effect of household income prior to retirement 
and the negative effect of private pensions. Only the financially well-off will be able to afford early 
retirement.  The negative effect for higher education for men in the UK is somewhat counter intuitive to this 
as we would expect this to be positively correlated with income. However, it may reflect the fact that people 
with higher education are in jobs that they are less likely to want to retire from and it is consistent with the 
predictions of human capital theory that more highly qualified people remain longer in the labour market to 
extend the payback period on their investment. 
 
For Germany the effect of household income (prior to retirement) in the econometric models is negative 
(and significant for males) confirming the results of the inequality analysis; those with higher incomes are less 
likely to retire early after controlling for health status and other characteristics.  
 
7. Conclusion and policy recommendations  
Germany and the UK share concerns about the sustainability of the public pension system and potential 
labour shortages arising from the ageing of the population. Debates have centred on encouraging people to 
work for longer but this has neglected the important role of the health of older workers as a primary 
determinant of whether or not they remain in the labour market.  
 
Our findings suggest confirm that health is an important determinant of the decision to retire in the UK and 
Germany. This is the case for both men and women and is observed for both latent health status and 
alternative health measures. The effects of spouse’s health do not appear to be important but there is some 
evidence of an effect from having a working spouse.  
 
The trend towards increasing early retirement has obvious fiscal implications as increasing numbers of older 
people become dependent on a shrinking working population. It can also be considered a waste of human 
capital if people with education and skills are leaving the labour force prematurely. Designing financial 
incentives to encourage people to work for longer may not be sufficient as a policy tool if people are leaving 
the labour market involuntarily due to health problems. Indeed, in this context, even raising the statutory 
retirement effect may have no effect if poor health is the underlying reason for inactivity.  
 
Instead there is a need to improve the health of the workforce and to devote resources to facilitating 
continued work for people with health problems. More has been done in this regard in Germany than the 
UK, although it has not targeted older workers particularly (see Frerichs and Taylor, 2005). Optimism may 
come from early evaluation of the UK Pathways to Work scheme for people on IB, which suggests that this 
has been more effective with older claimants than younger ones (Adam et al, 2006). However, this 
programme only targets people who have already left the labour force whereas it may be more effective to 
design policy that helps older workers to remain economically active. Once individuals leave the labour 
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market their skills start to deteriorate so it is better to keep them in, by say allowing more flexible working 
arrangements to cope with health problems.  
 
8. References 
 
Abbring JH, van den Berg GJ. (2003) The Nonparametric Identification of Treatment Effects in Duration 
Models. Econometrica 71:1491-517. 
Adam S Emmerson C Frayne C Goodman A (2006) Early quantitative evidence on the impact of the Pathways to 
Work pilots. DWP Research Report 354.  
 
Anderson KH, Burkhauser RV. (1985). The Retirement-Health Nexus: A New Measure of an Old Puzzle. 
Journal of Human Resources 20: 315-330. 
 
Antolin P and Scarpetta S. (1998) Microeconometric analysis of the retirement decision: Germany. OECD Economics 
Dept Working Papers No 204. 
 
Au D, Crossley TF, Schellhorn M. (2005) The effects of health shocks and long-term health on the work 
activity of older Canadians.  Health Economics 14: 999-1018. 
 
Bardasi E, Jenkins SP, Rigg JA. (2002) Retirement and the income of older people: a British perspective. 
Ageing and Society 22: 131-159. 
 
Bazzoli GJ. (1985) The early retirement decision: new empirical evidence on the influence of health. Journal of 
Human Resources 20: 214-234. 
 
Berthoud R (2004) The profile of exits from incapacity-related benefits over time. Department for Work and Pensions 
Working Paper No. 14.  
 
Blau DM, Riphahn RT. (1999) Labor force transitions of older married couples in Germany. Labour 
Economics 6: 229-252. 
 
Blundell R, Meghir C, Smith, S. (2002) Pension incentives and the pattern of early retirement. Economic 
Journal 112: 153-170. 
 
Borsch-Supan A Schnabel R (1997) Social Security and Retirement in Germany. NBER Working Papers 6153, 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
 
Bound J. (1991) Self-reported versus objective measures of health in retirement models. Journal of Human 
Resources  26: 106-138. 
 
Bound J, Schoenbaum M, Stinebrickner TR., Waidmann T. (1999) The dynamic effects of health on the 
labor force transitions of older workers. Labour Economics 6: 179-202. 
 
Contoyannis PC, Jones AM, Rice N. (2004) The dynamics of health in the British Household Panel Survey.   
Journal of Applied Econometrics 19: 473-503. 
 
Deschryvere M (2004) Health and retirement decisions: a review of the literature. Discussion Paper 932 The Research 
Institute of the Finnish Economy, Helsinki, Finland.  
 
Disney R, Meghir C, Whitehouse E. (1994)  Retirement behaviour in Britain. Fiscal Studies 15: 24-43. 
 
 19
Disney R, Emmerson C, Wakefield M. (2006) Ill-health and retirement in Britain: a panel data-based analysis.  
Journal of Health Economics 25: 621-649.  
 
DWP - Dept for Work and Pensions (2002) Pathways to Work: Helping people into employment. Cm5690, London: 
HMSO 
 
Dwyer DS, Mitchell OS. (1999). Health problems as determinants of retirement: are self-rated measures 
endogenous? Journal of Health Economics 18: 173-193. 
 
French, E. (2005) The effects of health, wealth, and wages on labour supply and retirement behaviour. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 72: 395-427. 
 
Frerichs F Taylor P (2005) The greying of the labour market: what can Britain and Germany learn from each other? 
Anglo German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society.  
 
Gustman AL, Steinmeier TL. (2000) Retirement in dual-career families: a structural model. Journal of Labor 
Economics 18: 503-545 
 
Hernandez-Quevedo C; Jones AM, Rice N. (2005) Reporting bias and heterogeneity in self-assessed health. Evidence 
from the British Household Panel Survey, HEDG WP 05/04, University of York. 
 
Humphrey A, Costigan P, Pickering K, Stratford N, and Barnes M. (2003) Factors affecting the labour market 
participation of older workers. Research Report No 200. Department for Work and Pensions.  
 
Hurd MD. (1990) Research on the elderly: economic status, retirement and consumption and saving. Journal 
of Economic Literature 28: 565-637. 
 
Jenkins SP. (1995) Easy Estimation Methods for Discrete-Time Duration Models. Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics. 57: 129-138. 
 
Jiménez-Martín S, Labeaga JM, Martinez-Granado M. (1999) Health status and retirement decisions for older 
European couples. IRISS Working Paper Series. No. 1999-01. Luxembourg. 
  
Jones AM, Koolman, X, Rice, N. (2006) Health-related non-response in the BHPS and ECHP: using 
probability weighted estimators in nonlinear models. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A 169: 543-569. 
 
Kerkhofs, M, Lindeboom, M. (1995) Subjective health measures and state dependent reporting errors. Health 
Economics 4: 221-235. 
 
Kerkhofs M,  Lindeboom M,  Theeuwes, J. (1999) Retirement, financial incentives and health. Labour 
Economics 6: 203-227.  
 
Lazear EP. (1986) Retirement from the labour force. In Handbook of Labour Economics Vol 1. Ashenfelter OC, 
Layard R (eds). Elsevier: Amsterdam. 
 
Lindeboom, M. (2006) Health and work of older workers. In Elgar Companion to Health Economics. Jones AM 
(ed). Edward Elgar: Aldershot. 
 
Lumsdaine RL, Mitchell OS. (1999) New developments in the economic analysis of retirement," In Handbook 
of Labor Economics Vol 3. Ashenfelter OC, Card D (eds). Elsevier: Amsterdam. 
 
Meghir, C Whitehouse, E (1997) "Labour market transitions and retirement of men in the UK." Journal of 
Econometrics, 79 (2), 327-354. 
 
Meyer, BD (1990). “Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells”. Econometrica 58(4): 757-782. 
 
 20
Michaud PC. (2003) Joint labour supply dynamics of older couples. Tilburg University, Center for Economic 
Research, Discussion Paper: 69.  
 
Naegele G and Walker A. (2002) Ageing and social policy: towards an agenda for policy learning between Britain and 
Germany.  Anglo German Foundation for the Study of Industrial Society 
 
OECD (2005) Pensions at a Glance: Public Policies Across OECD Countries. OECD Publishing.  
 
Oswald C. (1999) Patterns of labour market exit in Germany and the UK.  ISER Essex. 
 
Peasgood T Roberts J Tsuchiya A (2006) Incapacity Benefit: A Health or Labour Market Phenomenon? Sheffield 
Economics Research Paper 2006011; University of Sheffield.  
 
Riphahn RT. (1997) Diasbility, retirement and unemployment: substitute pathways for labour force exit? An 
empirical test for the case of Germany. Applied Economics 29: 551-561. 
 
Riphahn RT. (1999)  Income and employment effects of health shocks. A test case for the German welfare 
state. Journal of Population Economics 12: 363-389. 
 
Rice, N. Roberts, J., Jones, A.M. (2007) Sick of work or too sick to work? Evidence on health shocks and early 
retirement from the BHPS.Sheffield Economics Research Paper 2007002; University of Sheffield 
 
Siddiqui S. (1997) The impact of health on retirement behaviour: Empirical evidence from West Germany. 
Health Economics 6:425-38. 
Stern S. (1989) Measuring the effect of disability on labour force participation. Journal of Human Resources  24: 
361-395. 
 
Verbeek, M. (2000) A Guide to Modern Econometrics.  Wiley: Chichester.  
 
Verbeek M, Nijman TE. (1992) Testing for selectivity bias in panel data models. International Economic Review  
33: 681-703. 
 
Wagstaff A van Doorslaer E Paci P (1989). Equity in the finance and delivery of health care: some tentative 
cross-country comparisons. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 5(1): 89 – 112 
 
Zabel JE. (1999)  An analysis of attrition in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation with an application to a model of labor market behaviour. Journal of Human 
Resources 33: 479-506. 
 
Zaidi A, Frick JR, Buchel F. (2005) Income mobility in old age in Britain and Germany. Ageing and society 
25:543-65. 
Ziliak JP, Kniesner TJ, (1998) The importance of sample attrition in life cycle labor supply estimation. Journal 
of Human Resources 33: 507-530. 
 21
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics  
 BHPS  GSOEP 
 Men Women  Men Women 
Pre - Post - Pre – Post - Pre - Post - Pre – Post - 
Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement Retirement 
 All 
    
All 
    
 All 
    
All 
    
Retired 0.324   0.365   
 0.369   0.378   
Own Health              
Excellent SAH 0.238 0.257 0.197 0.209 0.241 0.153  0.315 0.339 0.275 0.347 0.382 0.289 
Good SAH  0.486 0.485 0.488 0.521 0.514 0.535  0.364 0.312 0.452 0.378 0.341 0.441 
Fair SAH 0.213 0.2 0.24 0.209 0.193 0.238  0.285 0.306 0.249 0.248 0.252 0.241 
Poor SAH  0.064 0.058 0.075 0.061 0.053 0.075  0.035 0.041 0.023 0.027 0.025 0.029 
              
Spousal Health              
Excellent SAH 0.156 0.171 0.126 0.157 0.183 0.113  0.352 0.371 0.32 0.368 0.397 0.309 
Good SAH  0.431 0.437 0.419 0.338 0.356 0.307  0.356 0.328 0.406 0.332 0.295 0.406 
Fair SAH 0.191 0.192 0.191 0.171 0.161 0.187  0.242 0.251 0.228 0.252 0.259 0.238 
Poor SAH  0.085 0.084 0.088 0.062 0.059 0.068  0.026 0.028 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.023 
              
Covariates              
Age 61.8 59.5 66.6 61 58.7 64.9  60 57.3 64.5 59.8 57.1 64.4 
Married or couple 0.867 0.886 0.827 0.744 0.774 0.691  0.876 0.877 0.875 0.743 0.791 0.662 
Spouse has job 0.413 0.528 0.174 0.369 0.493 0.153   0.419 0.491 0.296 0.56 0.629 0.445 
High education  0.084 0.087 0.078 0.061 0.064 0.057  0.176 0.185 0.162 0.093 0.087 0.103 
Medium education 0.18 0.188 0.164 0.113 0.114 0.11  0.519 0.497 0.554 0.394 0.408 0.371 
Low education  0.736 0.725 0.758 0.826 0.822 0.833  0.292 0.311 0.16 0.498 0.494 0.504 
Own house outright 0.522 0.421 0.732 0.563 0.484 0.699        
Own house with 
mortgage  
0.32 0.415 0.122 0.247 0.322 0.116 
       
Private rented 
accommodation 
0.046 0.054 0.027 0.044 0.055 0.024 
       
Local auth housing 0.112 0.109 0.118 0.147 0.139 0.16        
Owner occupier        0.472 0.447 0.514 0.436 0.426 0.453 
Subsidised housing         0.92 0.095 0.086 0.089 0.085 0.097 
Employer pension 0.539 0.527 0.563 0.372 0.38 0.359        
Private pension  0.402 0.454 0.274 0.224 0.266 0.142        
State pension  0.249 0.232 0.287 0.594 0.484 0.541        
Civil servant          0.095   0.024  
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Figure 1a: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves for the BHPS – Men  
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Figure 1b: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves for the BHPS – Women  
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Figure 2a: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves for the GSOEP – Men  
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Figure 2b: Kaplan Meier Survival Curves for the GSOEP – Women  
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Figure 3: CCs for 2-point deterioration in SAH for Britain and Germany. 
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Figure 4: CCs for early retirement (RETi) for Britain and Germany. 
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Figure 5: CCs for early retirement and 2-point SAH shock for Britain and Germany. 
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Table 2a: Hazard model for retirement transition in the UK - Men 
 
Health limitations 
N = 2,127 
(Latent) General Health 
N = 2,096 
  Coef S.E. 
Hazard 
ratio 
Coef S.E. 
Hazard 
ratio 
Own Health:       
Health limitations (t-1) 1.526* 0.402 4.589 -- -- -- 
Health limitations (0) 0.072 0.614 1.074 -- -- -- 
Latent health (t-1) -- -- -- -0.755* 0.261 0.470 
Latent health (0) -- -- -- 0.0723 0.332 1.075 
Spouse:       
Health limitations (t-1) 0.078 0.332 1.081 -- -- -- 
Latent health (t-1) -- -- -- -0.199 0.199 0.819 
Has job (t-1) -0.640* 0.287 0.527 -0.746* 0.294 0.474 
Education       
Degree or higher degree -1.228* 0.646 0.293 -1.097 0.637 0.334 
HND or A levels -0.225 0.399 0.799 -0.202 0.401 0.816 
O levels or CSEs -0.241 0.408 0.786 -0.182 0.419 0.834 
Income & Wealth :       
Own house with mortgage (t-1) 0.279 0.288 1.322 0.390 0.287 1.477 
Local auth or housing association (t-1) -0.002 0.552 0.998 0.053 0.548 1.054 
Private rented housing (t-1) -0.966 0.801 0.381 -1.035 0.814 0.355 
Log household income  1.135* 0.367 3.111 1.059* 0.368 2.882 
Pensions :       
Private pension  -0.944* 0.309 0.389 -0.998* 0.319 0.368 
Employer pension  0.551 0.444 1.734 0.547 0.450 1.727 
Private sector (0) 0.639 0.517 1.894 0.603 0.523 1.827 
Civil service/Local Government (0) 2.142* 0.675 8.520 2.000* 0.692 7.389 
Other sector (0) 0.553 0.702 1.739 0.504 0.713 1.655 
Occupational dummies       
Professional (0) -0.867 0.976 0.420 -1.081 1.002 0.339 
Management and administration (0) -0.853 0.454 0.426 -0.879 0.464 0.415 
Clerical and secretarial (0) -1.017 0.919 0.361 -1.190 0.969 0.304  
Craft and related l(0) -0.942 0.510 0.390 -0.998 0.521 0.369 
Personal services (0) -1.270 0.679 0.281 -1.132 0.686 0.322 
Sales (0) -0.341 0.957 0.711 -0.194 0.993 0.823 
Plant operative (0) -0.532 0.587 0.587 -0.539 0.590 0.583 
Other (0) -0.572 0.888 0.564 -0.358 0.876 0.699 
Socio-demographics:       
Married or couple  -0.179 0.461 0.836 -0.336 0.482 0.715 
Age 53 0.208 1.035 1.232 0.119 1.025 1.127 
Age 54 0.725 0.972 2.066 0.562 0.948 1.753 
Age 55 -0.815 1.276 0.442 -0.946 1.265 0.388 
Age 56 1.857* 0.854 6.405 1.775* 0.831 5.901 
Age 57 1.119 0.928 3.064 1.033 0.901 2.812 
Age 58 1.816* 0.889 6.146 1.769* 0.863 5.865 
Age 59 1.338 0.923 3.812 1.200 0.899 3.321 
Age 60 2.821* 0.914 16.786 2.657* 0.879 14.254 
Age 61 2.603* 0.933 13.511 2.483* 0.913 11.981 
Age 62 2.311* 0.976 10.084 2.217* 0.942 9.180 
Age 63 3.578* 0.973 35.780 3.456* 0.949 31.699 
Age 64 3.338* 1.035 28.164 3.203* 1.013 24.603 
 
Log likelihood 
LR test of gamma variation (p-value) 
 
-353.884 
7.854 (0.003) 
 
-357.665 
7.540 (0.003) 
* statistically significant at 5% level., (0) denotes initial (wave 1) values. Regional dummies included but not reported here.  
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Table 2b: Hazard model for retirement transition in the UK - Women 
 
  
Health limitations 
N = 1,018 
(Latent) General Health 
N = 1000 
 Coef S.E. 
Hazard 
ratio 
Coef S.E. 
Hazard 
ratio 
Own Health:       
Health limitations (t-1) 1.411* 0.435 4.103 -- -- -- 
Health limitations (0) -1.863* 0.815 0.155 -- -- -- 
Latent health (t-1) -- -- -- -0.834* 0.409 0.434 
Latent health (0) -- -- -- 0.113 0.517 1.120 
Spouse:       
Health limitations (t-1) 0.493 0.526 1.636 -- -- -- 
Latent health (t-1) -- -- -- -0.347 0.441 0.706 
Has job (t-1) -0.378 0.469 0.685 -0.261 0.538 0.770 
Education       
Degree or higher degree -0.561 0.995 0.571 -0.855 1.298 0.425 
HND or A levels -1.098 0.714 0.334 -1.066 0.896 0.344 
O levels or CSEs -0.148 0.415 0.862 -0.171 0.511 0.843 
Income & Wealth :       
Own house with mortgage (t-1) -0.373 0.382 0.688 -0.706 0.535 0.494 
Local authority or housing association (t-1) -0.019 0.624 0.980 -0.570 0.931 0.565 
Private rented housing (t-1) -0.932 1.064 0.394 -1.265 1.222 0.282 
Log household income  0.810* 0.195 2.248 1.129 0.635 3.093 
Pensions :       
Private pension  -1.132* 0.506 0.267 -1.382 0.737 0.251 
Employer pension  0.537 0.405 1.711 0.707 0.674 2.028 
Private sector (0) -1.484* 0.583 0.227 -1.364 0.882 0.256 
Civil service/Local Government (0) -2.061* 0.719 0.127 -2.026 1.138 0.132 
Other sector (0) -1.646* 0.765 0.193 -1.186 0.966 0.305 
Occupational dummies       
Professional (0) -0.662 0.899 0.516 -0.719 1.171 0.487 
Management and administration (0) -0.169 0.640 0.845 -0.069 0.829 0.932 
Clerical and secretarial (0) -0.818 0.674 0.441 -1.132 0.964 0.323 
Craft and related l(0) -1.177 1.149 0.308 -1.428 1.419 0.239 
Personal services (0) -0.789 0.632 0.454 -0.891 0.917 0.410 
Sales (0) 0.232 0.731 1.261 0.318 0.999 1.373 
Other (0) -0.591 0.838 0.554 -0.887 1.082 0.412 
Socio-demographics:       
Married or couple  -0.019 0.542 0.981 -0.515 0.848 0.597 
Age 53 0.726 1.198 2.067 -- -- -- 
Age 54 1.357 1.066 3.888 1.225 0.801 3.406 
Age 55/56 0.710 1.045 2.034 0.542 0.856 1.719 
Age 57 1.253 1.047 3.503 1.160 0.988 3.189 
Age 58 1.774 1.019 5.895 1.834 1.118 6.262 
Age 59 1.775 1.019 5.897 2.142 1.324 8.517 
Log likelihood 
LR test of gamma variation (p-value) 
-141.117 
0.000 (0.5) 
-143.685 
0.575 (0.224)  
* statistically significant at 5% level., (0) denotes initial (wave 1) values. Regional dummies included but not reported here.  
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Table 3a: Hazard model for retirement transition in Germany - Men 
 
 
Self Assessed Health  
N = 5,306 
(Latent) General Health 
N = 5,212 
  Coef S.E. 
Hazard 
ratio 
Coef S.E. 
Hazard 
ratio 
Own Health:       
Fair SAH (t-1) -0.427* 0.117 0.652 -- -- -- 
Good SAH (t-1) -0.561* 0.136 0.571 -- -- -- 
Excellent SAH (t-1) -0.709* 0.325 0.492 -- -- -- 
Fair SAH (0)  -0.146 0.140 0.864 -- -- -- 
Good SAH (0) -0.208 0.147 0.812 -- -- -- 
Excellent SAH (0) -0.225 0.233 0.798 -- -- -- 
Latent health (t-1) -- -- -- -0.225* 0.043 0.798 
Latent health (0) -- -- -- -0.071 0.042 0.932 
Spouse:       
Fair SAH (t-1) 0.062 0.116 1.064 -- -- -- 
Good SAH (t-1) 0.055 0.129 1.057 -- -- -- 
Excellent SAH (t-1) -0.066 0.357 0.936 -- -- -- 
Latent health (t-1) -- -- -- 0.064 0.039 1.066 
Has job (t-1) -0.032 0.098 0.968 -0.060 0.097 0.941 
Higher education  0.056 0.145 1.057 0.089 0.145 1.094 
Income & wealth:       
Log household income   -0.651* 0.130 0.521 -0.661* 0.131 0.516 
Owner occupier  -0.133 0.102 0.876 -0.102 0.103 0.903 
Subsidised housing -0.216 0.188 0.806 -0.192 0.187 0.826 
Pensions       
Civil service (0) 0.196 0.207 1.216 0.196 0.206 1.216 
Industry Sector:       
Agriculture (0) -0.567 0.348 0.567 -0.506 0.349 0.603 
Energy (0) -0.054 0.417 0.947 0.037 0.418 1.038 
Manufacturing (0) -0.196 0.273 0.822 -0.160 0.274 0.852 
Construction (0) -0.456 0.291 0.634 -0.419 0.294 0.658 
Trade (0) -0.790* 0.325 0.454 -0.722* 0.326 0.485 
Transport (0) 0.320 0.322 1.377 0.375 0.322 1.455 
Banking (0) -0.560 0.419 0.571 -0.471 0.419 0.624 
Services (0) -0.723* 0.287 0.485 -0.641* 0.289 0.527 
Origin:       
East German  -0.057 0.270 0.944 -0.103 0.284 0.902 
Foreigner  -0.458* 0.160 0.632 -0.394* 0.161 0.674 
Socio-demographics:       
Married or couple  0.448* 0.180 1.565 0.148 0.265 1.160 
Age 54 0.861 0.450 2.364 0.864 0.449 2.374 
Age 55 0.173 0.501 1.189 0.199 0.500 1.220 
Age 56 0.966* 0.416 2.626 0.893* 0.419 2.443 
Age 57 1.707* 0.384 5.512 1.673* 0.384 5.328 
Age 58 1.617* 0.388 5.036 1.607* 0.388 4.992 
Age 59 1.520* 0.393 4.575 1.523* 0.393 4.586 
Age 60 1.882* 0.384 6.565 1.869* 0.383 6.487 
Age 61 3.068* 0.367 21.493 3.051* 0.366 21.131 
Age 62 3.050* 0.373 21.112 3.019* 0.373 20.462 
Age 63 2.614* 0.392 13.654 2.558* 0.393 12.906 
Age 64 3.716* 0.378 41.113 3.721* 0.377 41.298 
Log likelihood -1433.223 -1403.089 
* statistically significant at 5% level., (0) denotes initial (wave 1) values. Regional dummies included but not reported here.  
Models estimated without heterogeneity  
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Table 3b: Hazard model for retirement transition in Germany - Women 
 
Self Assessed Health  
N = 2,293 
(Latent) General Health 
N = 2,234 
  Coef S.E. 
Hazard 
ratio 
Coef S.E. 
Hazard 
ratio 
Own Health:       
Fair SAH (t-1) -1.257* 0.400 0.285 -- -- -- 
Good SAH (t-1) -2.011* 0.542 0.134 -- -- -- 
Excellent SAH (t-1) -2.154 1.325 0.116 -- -- -- 
Fair SAH (0)  -0.293 0.553 0.746 -- -- -- 
Good SAH (0) -0.767 0.612 0.464 -- -- -- 
Excellent SAH (0) -0.403 1.033 0.669 -- -- -- 
Latent health (t-1) -- -- -- -0.554* 0.159 0.574 
Latent health (0) -- -- -- -0.365 0.201 0.694 
Spouse:       
Fair SAH (t-1) -0.416 0.484 0.660 -- -- -- 
Good SAH (t-1) 0.238 0.505 1.268 -- -- -- 
Excellent SAH (t-1) 0.427 1.367 1.532 -- -- -- 
Latent health (t-1) -- -- -- 0.219 0.158 1.244 
Has job (t-1) -0.325 0.417 0.722 -0.441 0.416 0.643 
Higher education  -0.477 0.511 0.621 -0.415 0.518 0.661 
Income & wealth:       
Log household income   -0.478 0.516 0.620 -0.479 0.526 0.620 
Owner occupier  -0.487 0.442 0.615 -0.586 0.453 0.556 
Subsidised housing 0.575 0.697 1.777 0.345 0.746 1.412 
Industry Sector:       
Manufacturing (0) -0.821 0.636 0.440 -0.864 0.652 0.852 
Trade (0) -0.767 0.760 0.465 -1.002 0.802 0.485 
Services (0) -0.425 0.572 0.654 -0.558 0.602 0.527 
Origin:       
East German  0.847 1.049 2.333 0.469 1.031 0.902 
Foreigner  -0.601 0.646 0.548 -0.579 0.639 0.674 
Socio-demographics:       
Married or couple  -1.206 0.584 0.299 -2.229* 0.877 0.108 
Age 55 1.978* 0.740 7.227 1.826* 0.708 6.213 
Age 56 2.535* 0.730 12.622 2.458* 0.693 11.692 
Age 57 3.075* 0.857 21.649 3.023* 0.779 20.573 
Age 58 3.129* 0.977 22.857 2.874* 0.862 17.717 
Age 59 3.912* 1.091 49.986 3.712* 0.931 40.970 
 
Log likelihood 
LR test of gamma variation (p-value) 
 
-299.811 
9.423 (0.001) 
 
-289.959 
10.301 (0.001)  
* statistically significant at 5% level., (0) denotes initial (wave 1) values. Regional dummies included but not reported here.  
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Table 4: Verbeek and Nijman (1992) test for attrition bias. 
 
NEXT WAVE β  S.E.  z-test p-value 
BHPS 
Men 
  Health limitations 
  Latent self-assessed health 
Women 
  Health limitations 
  Latent self-assessed health 
 
 
.843 
.631 
 
.009 
.004 
 
 
.461 
.424 
 
.664 
.691 
 
 
1.83 
1.49 
 
.01 
.01 
 
 
.068 
.136 
 
.988 
.996 
GSOEP 
Men 
  Self-assessed health 
  Latent self-assessed health  
Women 
  Self-assessed health 
  Latent self-assessed health  
 
 
-.161 
-.198 
 
-.596 
-.302 
 
 
.139 
.138 
 
.596 
.630 
 
 
1.16 
1.44 
 
1.00 
.48 
 
 
.244 
.151 
 
.317 
.631 
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Appendix: Variable codes, definitions and data sources 
 
Variable name Description Definition UK Definition Germany 
Retirement 
status 
Self-reported retirement status  1 - retired 
0 - otherwise 
1 - retired 
0 - otherwise 
Latent health  continuous  continuous  
Excellent SAH 1 – excellent, 0 - otherwise 1 – very good,  0 - 
otherwise 
Good SAH 1 – good, 0 - otherwise 1 – good,  0 - otherwise 
Fair SAH 1 – fair, 0 - otherwise 1 – fair, 0 - otherwise 
Self-assessed 
health 
 
Poor SAH  1 - poor or v poor, 0 - 
otherwise 
1 - poor or bad, 0 - 
otherwise 
Health 
limitations 
“Does your health in any way limit your daily 
activities compared to most people of your age?” 
1 - yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Arms, legs, hands 1 - yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Sight 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
hearing 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Skin conditions or allergies 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Chest/breathing 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Heart/blood pressure 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
stomach or digestion 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Anxiety or depression 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Diabetes 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
alcohol or drugs 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Epilepsy 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Migraine 1 – yes, 0 - otherwise -- 
Specific health 
problems 
Other  1 – yes, 0 - otherwise  
Formal disability 
rating 
Degree of disability as per German Pension Office -- 0-100% 
 
Health 
satisfaction  
 
Person’s satisfaction with own health 
-- 11 point scale: 
0 - ‘not at all satisfied’  
10 - ‘completely satisfied’  
Highest level of formal education obtained 
O level or CSEs  
1 - CSE, O level 
0 - otherwise 
1 – more than mandatory 
schooling 
0 - otherwise 
HND or A level 1 - A level, HND, HNC, 
Teaching 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
Education 
Degree or higher degree  1 - degree, higher degree 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
Private pension  1 - private pension 
0 - otherwise 
1 - Class 1 civil servant 
0 - otherwise 
Employer pension  1 - employer pension 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
Private sector 1 - employed in private 
company 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
civil service or local government 
 
1 - employed in civil service or 
local government 
0 - otherwise  
-- 
Pension 
entitlement 
Other sector  1 - employed in other 
employment sector 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
Individual specific mean of log household income continuous -- Income 
Mean of log household post-government income -- continuous 
Own house with mortgage 1 - own house with mortgage 
0 - otherwise 
1 - owner occupier 
0 - otherwise 
Private rented accommodation  1 - live in private rented 
accommodation 
0 - otherwise 
1 - live in subsidised 
housing 
0 - otherwise 
Housing tenure 
Housing association of local authority rented 
housing  
1 - live in housing association 
or local authority rented 
accommodation 
0 - otherwise 
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Variable name Description Definition UK Definition Germany 
Marital or couple  1 - married or living as a couple 
0 - otherwise  
1 – married or living as a 
couple 
0 - otherwise 
Age 50-54 1 - aged 50 and 54 years 
0 - otherwise 
1 - aged 50 and 54 years 
0 - otherwise 
Age 55-99 1 - aged 55 and 59 years 
0 - otherwise 
1 - aged 55 and 59 years 
0 - otherwise 
Age 60-64 1 - aged 60 and 64 years 
0 - otherwise 
1 - aged 60 and 64 years 
0 - otherwise 
Age 65-69 1 - aged 65 and 69 years 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
Region/State of residence 18 individual dummy variables  
North  -- 1 - lives in North 
0 - otherwise 
South -- 1 - lives in Sorth 
0 - otherwise 
East German -- 1 - born in East Germany 
0 - otherwise 
Demographic and other variables 
Foreigner -- 1 - born outside Germany 
0 - otherwise 
spouse latent health continuous variables continuous variable 
spouse SAH fair -- 1 - spouse SAH is fair 
0 - otherwise 
spouse SAH good  -- 1 - spouse SAH is good 
0 - otherwise 
spouse SAH excellent  -- 1 - spouse SAH is excellent 
0 - otherwise 
spouse health limitations 1 - spouse has health limitations 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
spouse has job  1 - spouse is employed 
0 - otherwise 
1 - spouse is employed 
0 - otherwise 
Spouse variables 
Description Definition UK Definition Germany 
Variable name management or administration 
 
1 - management or 
administration 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
professional 1 - professional 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
clerical or secretarial 1 - clerical or secretarial 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
craft or related 1 - craft or related 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
personal or protective services 1 - personal or protective 
services 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
sales 1 - sales 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
plant operator 1 - plant operator 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
other occupations 1 - other occupations 
0 - otherwise 
-- 
Occupational class  
Agriculture -- 1 - agriculture 
0 - otherwise 
Industrial sector Energy -- 1 - energy 
0 - otherwise 
 Manufacturing -- 1 - manufacturing 
0 - otherwise 
 Construction -- 1 - construction 
0 - otherwise 
 Trade -- 1 - trade 
0 - otherwise 
 Transport -- 1 - transportation 
0 - otherwise 
 Banking -- 1 - banking or insurance 
0 - otherwise 
 Services -- 1 – services 
0 - otherwise 
 
 
